VDV reconnaissance in action. How to get in the airborne reconnaissance?

In our country deserved respect and unfading glory is used by the airborne troops. Serving them falls not everyone, but those who felt the power of the brotherhood of brotherhood of "Uncle Vasya's troops" will never forget about it. But even among the airborne reconnaissance - something special. Scouts in the amphibious forces are respected more than others, since the lives of all fighters who participate in the operation often depend on their work.

Features of reconnaissance units of the Airborne Forces

In the Soviet era, military doctrine prescribes the participation of amphibious forces in offensive operations. In them, the elite of the Airborne Forces, intelligence, had to provide only a more or less "smooth" landing, with a minimum loss of personnel.

They assigned tasks to the commander-in-chief of that district, to which the corresponding connection was attached. It was on this person that he was responsible for obtaining reliable and timely intelligence data. The Airborne Staff could order everything, up to the space images of the proposed landing areas, complete descriptions of the captured objects (up to the floor plans). The GRU specialists were directly responsible for providing these data.

When did the airborne troops begin to work? Intelligence began to work only after the landing, and supplied information exclusively to its units. And here we come to the most important: the operational (!) Reconnaissance service of the Airborne Forces was not, however paradoxical it may sound. This played a cruel joke on the paratroopers: when in the 1980s their units began to participate in local conflicts, it immediately became clear that the current organization was no good.

Difficulties with obtaining information

Just imagine: practically all the operational information (route, armament, equipment of the enemy) was received by intelligence (!) In the central apparatus of the KGB, in the internal troops and even in the Ministry of Internal Affairs! Of course, in this situation, no one was surprised at either the poorly confirmed data, or the delay in obtaining it, and behind-the-scenes intrigues inflicted a lot of blood on the landing party ...

After suffering all the necessary information, the group flew to the landing site, studied the situation on the spot, immediately marked the route. Only after this, the data went to the commanders, on which the reconnaissance of the airborne forces depended. "Bats " from the GRU, as far as possible, helped their colleagues, but their possibilities were not unlimited: some specific information could be obtained only by the paratroopers themselves.

Very often it happened that intelligence was puffed up both for themselves and for the main parts: they not only paved the way for the group, but also constantly entered into fire contact with the militants (which in itself under such conditions is unacceptable), made sure that Those did not arrange provocations, literally "by the hand" conducted to the places of operations of the part of both the Airborne Forces and other combat arms.

Due to high losses and unavailability for fulfilling such specific tasks, in the early 1990s a separate battalion was created, which was tasked with carrying out operational reconnaissance activities. In addition, the period includes the creation of all necessary "infrastructure" necessary for the successful fulfillment of the tasks set by the command.

About technical equipment

How in the technical plan were equipped with airborne troops? Exploration did not have anything particularly outstanding: for example, in Afghanistan, specialists had to do with ordinary binoculars and artillery shells. Only there they received some types of radar stations, which were intended to detect moving targets, as well as laser range finders. It should be noted that Western intelligence agents used these "modern" devices for a long time, which was largely proved by Afgan. The reconnaissance of the airborne forces in action is a terrible force, but the number of losses in collision with a better equipped enemy was still great.

A real gift was a series of portable direction finders: Aqualung-R / U / K. Unlike the previously used equipment of this kind, this equipment made it possible to reliably detect radiation sources, the fighters were able to guarantee the interception of enemy negotiations on waves of HF and VHF, as well as at frequencies traditionally used by reconnaissance airborne troops. "Bats", the GRU special forces, also highly appreciated this technique.

Veterans recall that this technique provided invaluable assistance in the detection of bandit groups and gangs, which, before the adoption of the Aqualungs, were often used by secret trails. The army command finally managed to persuade the party leadership to issue an order to start the creation of a special reconnaissance vehicle designed specifically for the Airborne Forces, but the disintegration of the Union prevented these plans from being realized. In principle, the fighters were satisfied with the "Reostat" machine, which had been used up to that time and had good technical equipment.

The problem was that weapons were not put on it, since initially it was intended for absolutely other purposes, which the VDV intelligence was not interested in. Afgan once again proved that all (!) Military equipment must necessarily have a regular weapon.

About what they did not get

Despite the fact that the Afghan campaign clearly demonstrated the vital need to equip intelligence units with laser targeting weapons, it has not appeared in the Airborne Forces (however, as in the entire SA). Actually, active military tests of such weapons began in the Union since the mid-1980s, but there was one subtlety here. The fact is that "homing" does not mean the presence of an intellect in the missile: the aiming is carried out on a laser "pointer", which is corrected from the ground or water. Scouts were ideal candidates for work with laser fire controllers, but our army did not appear.

Paratroopers (as well as simple infantry, however) quite often had to master the aviation "jargon". So it was possible to more precisely direct attack aircraft and helicopters on the target, using a conventional radio. And they did not want to get themselves into the "friendly" fire. The Americans already then were different: they had means of indicating goals that, in a really automatic mode, having received data from ground services, could direct combat aircraft and helicopters to the target.

Well-equipped Iraqi troops during the Desert Storm were completely defeated: US troops simply "stacked" missiles with accurate guidance on their tanks. There was practically no risk, but Iraq almost immediately left without heavy armored vehicles. Our deep reconnaissance of the airborne forces could only envy them.

Chechen weekdays

While in Afghanistan intelligence was at least engaged in really specialized activities, in Chechnya the fighters again became "specialists of a broader profile": often they had to not only detect but also destroy militants. Chronically, there were not enough specialists, many types of troops did not have any equipment or trained fighters, and therefore the Airborne Forces (intelligence in particular) were officially reconfigured for conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities.

Fortunately, by 1995, the recruitment of the 45th Special Purpose Regiment (which had become a real legend) was almost completed. The uniqueness of this unit is that at its creation not only the experience of all foreign armies was actively studied, but also actively used in practice. Taking into account the lessons of Afghanistan, the trained groups immediately trained not only for reconnaissance, but also for direct firing clashes with the enemy.

To this end, the 45th regiment was immediately given the necessary number of medium and heavy armored vehicles. In addition, the paratroopers, finally, appeared "Nones" - unique mortar-artillery systems that allow fire with shells with "honest" homing ("Kitolov-2").

Finally, in reconnaissance units of other airborne regiments (military intelligence in this respect went far ahead), finally, line departments were created. BTR-80 was used to equip them, they were used only as reconnaissance vehicles (there were no fighters in the landing compartment), the calculations of automatic fire extinguishers (automatic grenade launchers) and flamethrower systems were actively prepared and coordinated.

The difficulty was in the other. Our fighters immediately began to say that the reconnaissance of the airborne troops of Ukraine (from the best nationalists) is participating in the war on the side of the militants. Since there were specialists trained by the fighters, even friends often met in battle.

Why was it done?

All these measures made it possible to prepare in the shortest possible time for the outputs of the group, trained and equipped to carry out combat missions in the difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain. Moreover, these units had a sufficient number of heavy weapons, which allowed them to not only report on their dislocations, but also to join the battle independently. Armor is often rescued scouts, suddenly faced with superior enemy forces.

It was the experience of the landing forces that gave impetus to the re-equipment of reconnaissance units of other combat arms, who also received heavy armored vehicles. The fact is that the reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces in action has proved that a couple of armored personnel carriers can greatly improve the effectiveness of military operations.

Drones

It was in the 45th regiment that for the first time in our history combat tests of UAV began, which are now a real "hit" for the same Americans. There was a domestic drones far from nothing: since the late 80's there was an active development of the intelligence complex "Story-P", the main "olfactory feeling" of which was to become a flying machine "Pchela-1T".

Unfortunately, before the war began, he was never brought to his senses, since the method of landing was not considered. But already in April the first "Story-P" went to Khankala. Five "bees" were attached to it at once. Tests immediately proved the highest effectiveness of such weapons in the conditions of modern wars. So, it was possible to accurately attach up to a centimeter all the identified positions of the militants to the map, which was immediately appreciated by the artillerymen.

Complexities of operation

A total of 18 launches were made, all of them were produced in the mountains in which the military reconnaissance of the airborne forces was forced to act more often. The military immediately had claims to the running gear of the "Bees". However, the technicians managed to achieve satisfactory operation of the engines, after which the depth of reconnaissance immediately increased to 50 kilometers or more.

To the greatest regret, the difficulties of the 90s led to the fact that only 18 Pchela-1T vehicles were in service in the whole country. Ten of them were stored on the basis of the Black Sea fleet in the Crimea, where tests were conducted for launching them from the deck of ships. Alas, but there they were treated not in the best way: the design bureau had to work hard to bring the "bees" to the condition after storage in unsuitable conditions.

In the end, in the Chechen mountains began flights of 15 vehicles. Two by that time were lost in combat conditions, and one "Black Sea" could not be restored.

Gold or unmanned vehicles

Initially, it was planned that the armed forces of the airborne reconnaissance throughout the country will be at least a hundred such vehicles. The joyful military immediately handed over all the technical documentation for their production to the Smolensk Aviation Plant. The labor proletarians immediately disappointed them: even with the most modest estimates, unmanned vehicles turned out to be almost more expensive than gold.

Because of this, the production was abandoned. Other 15 vehicles served as scouts for glory: they were brought back to the design bureau, again launched and invariably received the most accurate information, which could not always reach the landing. Airborne reconnaissance is very grateful to the developers of the "Bees", as hard-working machines have saved many lives.

Scout-propagandists

Alas, but the command of scouts was not always able to correctly use all the means that he had at his disposal. So, at the time Mozdok was transferred not less than five dozen people, specialists in "psychological operations". At their disposal was a mobile printing house and a receiving and transmitting television center. With the help of the latter, the intelligence services planned to broadcast propaganda materials.

But only the command did not envisage that staff specialists could provide television broadcasting, but there were no operators and correspondents in the detachment. With the leaflets everything turned out even worse. They turned out to be so bad in content and appearance that they caused only discouragement. In general, the post of specialists in psychological work was among the scouts not too much in demand.

Logistics Support and Supply Issues

Beginning with the first campaign, the disgusting equipment of reconnaissance groups of the Airborne Forces (and other branches of the armed forces too) began to affect, which increased the traumatism and increased the risk of detection. As a result, the paratroopers had to recruit veterans who raised funds for equipping their colleagues. Alas, the Second Chechen War was characterized by exactly the same problems. So, in 2008, the Union of Airborne Troops collected money for convenient unloading, import boots, sleeping bags and even medical supplies ...

How has the reconnaissance of the airborne reconnaissance since Soviet times changed?

Unlike last years, the command began to pay much more attention to the training of small reconnaissance and combat groups. It finally became clear that in modern conditions they are much more important than divisions. Simply put, the role of individual training for each fighter has risen dramatically, which is simply vital for scouts, as each of them can rely solely on his own forces in a combat output.

What remained unchanged is the airborne reconnaissance chevrons: they are depicting a bat (like the GRU). In 2005, a decree was issued that ordered all intelligence agencies to switch to a chevron with an image of an eagle clutching a carnation and a black arrow in the clutches, but so far no particular progress has been made in this direction. Of course, the form of reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces has also changed completely: it has become much more convenient, it has been full-time unloading.

Correspondence of reconnaissance of airborne forces to modern realities

Experts say that today the situation is not too bright. Of course, the rearmament process is beginning to please, but the technical equipment does not reach the generally accepted standards.

So, for Americans, up to ¼ of the personnel of a division of any kind of troops are just intelligence. At us the share of personnel who can be engaged in such operations, at the best is equal to 8-9%. The difficulty is also that previously there were separate reconnaissance battalions in which first-class specialists were trained. Now there are only specialized companies, the level of training of personnel in which is not so high.

How to get here

And how to get in the airborne reconnaissance? First, each candidate must pass a standard medical commission for fitness for military service. The health status should correspond to category A1 (A2 in the extreme case).

It will not be superfluous to file a report in the name of the military commissioner of that recruiting station, from where you intend to go to give your duty to the Motherland. On all subsequent commissions also voice your desire. In the meantime, information about your desire to serve in the airborne reconnaissance will appear in your file. At the collecting point, try to enter into personal contact with the "buyers" of the amphibious forces.

As soon as you arrive at the place of service, file a report to the commander of the unit with a petition to transfer you to a reconnaissance company. It is important to withstand further dropouts, which are done by passing a fairly tough physical training exam. The competition is high. The requirements for candidates are extremely high. At once we will notice that it is necessary to learn about them before conscription into the army, as the standards change quite often.

Do not forget about the psychological tests designed to identify those fighters who can actually serve in such a specific kind of troops, which is the reconnaissance department of the airborne troops. And to take these inspections should be extremely serious: "closing your eyes", their results will not be looked at here. Only a man who is bold enough, intelligent and can be extremely cold-blooded in a deadly situation, is worthy of enlistment in the intelligence unit. And further. Preference is given to those candidates who have a WUS. In addition, highly qualified people who have a civilian specialty, which could be useful (signalers, electronics engineers).

Do not forget about the contract service in intelligence. As is the case with many of the most important kinds of troops (frontier guards, in particular), the advantage is now given to those soldiers who served an emergency in the same troops where they apply for admission to the contract. That's how to get into the airborne reconnaissance.